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The Still Questionable Role of Private Legislatures
Alan Schwartz"
In 1995, Robert Scott and I published the first formally analyzed
private law making bodies such as the American Law Institute
("ALI") and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws ("NCCUSL") function.' Adapting models drawn from the
modem positive political theory literature, we predicted that a private
legislature (a "PL") would: (a) have a status quo bias, rejecting
serious reforms; (b) adopt rules (as opposed to standards) when
lobbied by a single interest group;2 and (c) adopt standards, or
succumb to paralysis, when lobbied by competing groups. The
impressionistic evidence and a content analysis of the U.C.C. and the
ALI Corporate Governance rules were consistent with the models'
results. Because we focused on private legislatures, we did not make
a serious comparison between the competencies of these legislatures
and ordinary legislative bodies. Nevertheless, we speculated that an
ordinary legislature would perform well relative to a PL because it
would have better mechanisms for resolving the plaims of competing
interest groups, and would be better able to find facts relevant to
proposed laws. We did not recommend that the ALI and NCCUSL
be abolished. Rather, we argued that these bodies should return to
their original mission-to treat only subjects where society had
reached a consensus on the relevant values, if that consensus could be
translated into law with the use of traditional legal expertise alone.
Our article attracted a fair amount of criticism which focused
primarily on the accuracy of certain assumptions of the assumptions
models. No critic has shown, however, that the models were solved
Copyright 2002, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Sterling Professor of Law, Yale University. Robert Rasmussen and Robert
E. Scott made helpful comments on prior drafts.
1. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private
Legislatures, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 595 (1995) [hereinafter "Schwartz & Scott"]. Our
article cited a number of prior papers that contained thick descriptions of the ALI
and NCCUSL's role in creating particular laws. Kathleen Patchel had previously
written an informal interest group analysis of the U.C.C., which argued that the
drafting process slighted consumer interests. See Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group
Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Laws Process: Some Lessons from the
Uniform Commercial Code, 78 Minn. L. Rev. 83 (1993). Almost
contemporaneously with our work, Larry Ribstein and Bruce Kobayashi published
an interesting empirical analysis of the adoption process for uniform state laws. See
Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State
Laws, 25 J. Legal Stud. 131 (1996).
2. The law giver specifies the content of a rule in advance (driving more than
sixty miles an hour is unlawful); and specifies the content of a standard ex post
(driving "unreasonably" is unlawful).
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incorrectly, nor has any critic provided a competing theory that
accurately predicts, as our theoretical results did, that an Article 2
revision, if it passed, would contain mainly standards; that the revised
Article 9 would contain mainly rules; and that the Products Liability
Restatement would choose standards so vacuous as to retain the status
quo. Our conclusions were tentatively stated, however, because our
formal work was preliminary and our data was impressionistically
assembled. Thus, we concluded by remarking the need for "more
theory and more evidence relating to how private law-making groups
function" before a conclusive judgment could be drawn regarding just
when, if ever, a PL would function well.3 Robert Rasmussen's paper
for this Symposium4 contains numerous interesting insights, but it
does not respond to this need.
This partly is because Rasmussen does not focus on private
legislatures as such; instead, he argues that the "case against" the
most successful PL legislative product, the U.C.C., is"uneasy." This
claim does not respond directly to the Schwartz and Scott paper
where we attempted to show that the mixture of rules and standards
in the U.C.C. was more the product of structural features that
characterize the ALl and NCCUSL than the result of policy choices
regarding the appropriate level of abstraction on which to write
statutes. Our analysis thus is consistent with the view that the U.C.C.
contains some valuable sections. Unsurprisingly, then, Rasmussen is
tougher on the Code than we were. He makes trenchant comments
about the statute's unprincipledly limited scope; concedes that much
of Articles 3 and 4 are unnecessary; recognizes that consumer
interests were slighted in the original Code and in revisions; notes
that Article 6 is withering away; criticizes the Article 9 revisions for
not considering the interests of tort claimants; notes that the Code's
coverage is being reduced by justifiable Federal interventions; and
does not attempt to exhibit the relative superiority of Code solutions
to important commercial problems.
Nevertheless, Rasmussen believes that there is something to be
said for a process that could produce a statute such as the U.C.C.. In
particular, he claims that: (a) "the U.C.C. drafting and revision
process . . . will produce a more technically competent set of laws
than would a public legislature;"5 ; (b) "[t]he uniform law process has
3. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 1, at 651.
4. Robert Rasmussen, The. Uneasy Case Against the Uniform Commercial
Code, 62 La. L. Rev. 1097 (2002) [hereinafter "Rasmussen"].
5. Prior scholars claimed that PL products are technically superior to typical
state legislative products. Rasmussen's claim seems novel in that it extends the
claim of superiority to Federal legislative products as well and makes clear that PL
technical competence extends not only to the drafting of individual sections, but to
the ability to create entire coherent statutes.
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the potential to reduce the payments made by the various interest
groups;" (c) all affected parties participated in the drafting of some
U.C.C. Articles and their revisions; the Articles thus internalize the
costs and gains the statute creates and so likely are efficient; and (d)
the U.C.C. may be "more complete" than an ordinary statute.
Regarding the need for uniformity in legal regulation,6 Rasmussen
argues that the ability of parties to write choice of law clauses in
contracts does not obviate the need for a nationally uniform law of
sales. This part of his article is very well done, and rewards careful
reading.7 But the last of his four claims is not seriously argued, and
the initial three are not sustained.
Rasmussen appears to attribute multiple meanings to the word
"technical" when he argues that PL products are technically superior
to those of an ordinary legislature, but none of these meanings can
sustain the claim. Initially, he may mean that the U.C.C. is better
drafted than a typical statute. Rasmussen's article, however, does not
provide criteria whereby one could assess whether one legislature's
drafting choices better implement the policy at issue than another
legislature's choices do or could. The absence of such criteria would
make it difficult to evaluate the evidence for a claim of better PL
drafting, but Rasmussen offers no evidence either. For example,
Rasmussen does not exhibit a set of U.C.C. sections dealing with a
subject and compare them to a similar set of sections in a typical
statute. He does note that Congress corrects mistakes in its statutes,
but this cannot prove his case since some mistakes will always be
made. Indeed, the Code's Permanent Editorial Board corrects
mistakes.
Rasmussen's claim may be that the U.C.C. is more coherently
drafted than other statutes, but he does not sustain this position. A
claim that statute A is more coherent than statute B is vague. The
claim could mean that A has fewer linguistically inconsistent sections
6. Private legislatures such as the ALl and NCCUSL cannot be justified only
on the ground that they produce needed uniform laws because, obviously,
uniformity also could be achieved by Federal statutes or regulations.
7. A definition of uniformity should include at least two concepts: that the law
"on the books" is uniform acrossjurisdictions; and that the law is uniformly applied
through time in a single jurisdiction, in the sense that similar contracts are
interpreted similarly through time. Rasmussen's argument runs only to uniformity
in the former sense, and argues that it is better achieved by statute than by contract.
Thus, his article does not address Scott's claim that the Code does badly, relative
to the common law, in achieving uniformity in the latter sense, and perhaps not so
well, relative to the common law, in achieving uniformity in the former sense. See
Robert E. Scott, The Uniformity Norm in Commercial Law: A Comparative
Analysis of Common Law and Code Methodologies, in The Jurisprudential
Foundations of Corporate and Commercial Law 149 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D.
Walt, eds. 2000).
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than B has. Or it could mean that B attempts to realize policies that
actually are inconsistent while A does not. Or it could mean that if
A uses a policy to resolve a problem, it will use that policy rather than
another to resolve similar problems. Rasmussen's claim that the
U.C.C. is more coherent than ordinary statutes dealing with the same
problems therefore suffers from two defects: he does not say what he
means by coherence in a statute, and he does not offer evidence that
the U.C.C. is more coherent on the meaning chosen than other
statutes.
Rasmussen's claim for the technical superiority of private
legislatures may refer instead to the idea that these legislatures deal
with "technical" subjects that are beyond the competence of ordinary
legislatures to resolve. Thus, he claims that "Article 9 is a very
complex statute that took a good deal of expertise to put together....
[I]t is fair to say that revised Article 9 is a better-drafted statute than
one that would have been produced at the Federal level."' This is
false. Congress produces tax, environmental, and regulatory statutes
that deal with issues far more complex than questions such as how
best to give notice of liens or how to set default priorities among
secured claimants. Indeed, the tax laws appear to deal well with the
latter questions.9 Therefore, to make persuasive the claim that
Congress could not write an effective personal property security
statute needs more argument than Rasmussen's article supplies.
Finally, Rasmussen sometimes seems to rest his claim of
technical superiority on the ability of a private legislature to draw on
the services of law professors. These professors do participate
extensively in the creation of laws such as the U.C.C. Rasmussen
thus may argue that law professors provide expertise to private
legislatures that is not available to Congress, but this claim would be
incorrect. The evaluation of a proposed statute may require legal,
scientific, economic or similar expertise. Law professors have legal
expertise. As Scott and I have observed, a private legislature does not
hold hearings, cannot require parties to testify or supply statements
and, as a matter of practice, does not pay for services. As a
consequence, private legislatures rely on the unpaid labor of legal
academics. In contrast, Congress and administrative agencies have
available to them the expertise of legal academics, scientists,
economists and others. Put simply, no PL could draw on as much
expertise as could the national legislature, federal administrative
agencies, or the legislatures of important commercial states when
passing a law.
8. Rasmussen, supra note 4, at 1144.
9. See The Federal Tax Lien Act, 26 U.S.C.§ 6321, et seq. (1990).
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The claim that the U.C.C. and other PL products exhibit high
technical competence relative to typical legislation is often made by
PL participants and is repeated by law professors. Those who make
the claim, however, do not specify what technical competence is in
the legislative context, provide evidence that private legislatures have
a lot of it, or refute the view that these legislatures can bring fewer
needed resources to bear on the solution of policy problems than
public legislatures can. Rasmussen's analysis of the U.C.C.
regrettably follows standard practice.
Rasmussen's claim that the U.C.C. process may reduce interest
group expenses is difficult to evaluate. Many observers want to
minimize spending by private groups used to influence legislation
because this spending is thought to distort the lawmaking process. If
this view is right, then that policy outcomes may be purchased more
cheaply from private legislatures than from the Congress would
appear to be a drawback of the PL process, not a strength. Perhaps
Rasmussen means only that the same law would require fewer social
resources to produce in a PL than in the Congress. This claim is not
obviously correct, but a serious argument for it is lacking.
Finally, Rasmussen's claim that some Articles (3, 4 and 9
apparently) were drafted by everyone whom the laws could affect,
and thus were likely to be efficient, is interesting but preliminary. It
is similar to the claim by Karl Llewellyn that trade association rules
are presumptively efficient when all affected parties participate in
creating the rules. Llewellyn, however, believed that when trade
associations deal with the unorganized public, they engage in
exploitation. As a result, trade association rules no longer deserve the
presumption of desirability.'° As Rasmussen carefully observes, the
banks and finance companies whom the Code regulates do deal with
consumers whose interests were not seriously considered in the
drafting process. Thus, his efficiency claim for these articles is only
partial. The claim also raises a question. Banks and finance
companies have trade associations. Why did they need a uniform law
to get effective self regulation? Two answers seem possible.
Holdouts could defeat private bargaining over rules, so that the
coercion of a statute is needed for efficiency. Or, the force of law
makes it easier for private groups to extract rents -from unorganized
outsiders. Rasmussen's article does not choose between these
possibilities, yet this choice seems essential to the making out of his
claim that at times the U.C.C. process is at least as efficient as the
usual legislative process would be.
10. See Alan Schwartz, Kar Llewellyn and the Origins of Contract Theory, in
The Jurisprudential Foundations ofCorporate and Commercial Law 12, 16-17 (Jody
S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt, eds. 2000).
11512002]
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There are a number of interesting things in Rasmussen's paper.
As said, the discussion on the difficulty of achieving national
uniformity by contract is original and seems right. There also are a
number of thoughtful remarks about particular U.C.C. Articles, and
some casual but useful history. Rasmussen's article, however, does
not add new theory or new facts to the debate over the efficacy of
private legislatures. If this is not yet clear, then see that his article
begins with this question: "Given that there are a number of
[legislative] institutions from which to pick, which institution would
we think does, on average, a better job?"" The article ends with a
discussion of Article 9 that asks the same question: "If Congress were
to have initial responsibility for some subset of secured transactions
and the states have responsibility for others, we would need to
articulate the basis on which one decided that a transaction is
governed by state law or federal law. This may not be an easy
matter."' Rasmussen asks the right question, but makes too little
progress in answering it.
11. Rasmussen, supra note 4, at 1110.
12. Id. at 1145.
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